Abstract This paper examines the deontic logic of the Talmud. We shall find, by looking at examples, that at first approximation we need deontic logic with several connectives: This is not the case in the Talmud for the T (Talmudic) operators, though it does hold for the D operators. We must change our underlying logic. We have to regard {O T , F T } and {O D , F D } as two sets of operators, where O T and F T are independent of one another and where we have some connections between the two sets. We shall
Emphasise the CTD examples and calibrate your logics to deal with various
problems associated with them.
The community lays stress on the theory of CTDs as distinctly characteristic to deontic logic, which sets it apart from being a secondary applied branch of modal logic. It is also felt that the essence of the deontic area is the possibility of violations and hence the core of deontic logic as a discipline distinct from modal logic is its theory of CTD.
For our purpose a contrary to duty system is a set D of formulas of the form fd 1 ; . . .; d n g where
Given a consistent set h ¼ ðE 1 ; . . .; E k Þ we consider the set Sergot (1996, 1997) , Gabbay (2008a Gabbay ( , b, 2010 , de Boer et al. (2011) .
In contrast with the above, The Talmud, being a religious code of law, given to us by God in the Bible, has two types of deontic rules: action obligations and action prohibitions. Both types represent the will of God for us to obey. This is why at a first logical approximation we need two independent deontic operations O T and F T (the subscript 'T' stands for 'Talmudic') as well as the standard deontic Obligation O D and prohibition F D .
There are some points we need to make clear. The variables X that go into the connectives O T X, F T X, O D X and F D X denote actions like work, lift, steal, wear Tefilin (Tefilin is something men wear when they offer morning prayers during week days), etc. and not lack of action like resting, not stealing, etc. When we negate them and write :X, we denote lack of action.
We are not going to discuss in this paper how to determine what is considered action and what is to be considered inaction. This is a separate issue. We assume it is always clear, for any candidate formulas A and :A, which is the action formula and which is the inaction formula.
One might think that we can model obligations and prohibitions using only one deontic operator O, letting OX represent obligations and O:X represent prohibitions. However this is not correct. Our obligations and prohibitions can apply either to X or to :X. See examples below under the heading ''Type 3: Strong obligation/ prohibition'. So O T X is a Biblical obligation to take action X. O T :X is a Biblical obligation not to take action X. F T X is a Biblical prohibition to take action X and F T :X is a Biblical prohibition not to take action X (i.e. we are prohibited from choosing not to take action X). So O T X is not equivalent to F T :X. So if X = wear Obligations and prohibitions 119 Tefilin, then having an obligation to wear it is not the same as being prohibited from not wearing it. So in some cases God requires us to obey both i.e. O T X^F T :X. The reader should recall intuitionistic logic where ::A is weaker than A, so the negation used in these commands have intuitionistic flavour. (In fact, the Talmudic system will be modelled in intuitionistic modal logic.) 2 If we look at this situation as logicians, we can say we have here three pairs of modal operators, each pair being of the form (Necessity of the form NX and Possibility of the form PX ¼ :N:X). The pairs are (N i , P i ), i = 1, 2, 3 as follows. Since the Talmud gives no connections between O T and F T , we have to represent them as two pairs N 1 X ¼ O T X; P 1 X ¼ :O T :X f g , and N 2 X ¼ F T :X; P 2 X ¼ f :
This can be made clearer when we consider the operational differences between O T A and F T A and F D A.
1. If you obey O T A then God rewards you. You are also obliged to spend 20% of your income to enable yourself to fulfil your obligation. 2. If you violate F T A, and actually do the forbidden A, then you will be punished (by God and or by law/society). Also you should devote 100% of your income to enable yourself to avoid doing A.
Therefore for the same X, if the Bible says O T X then 1. applies and if the Bible says F T :X, which in practice means the same to us, then 2. applies.
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F D A says it is forbidden to have A for whatever reason, without going into the fine tuning of why this is so. It may arise from a Biblical O T :A, or from F T A or from some related F T Y or whatever.
For example, in Type 1A: Obligation with deontic prohibition below we have O T (wear Tefilin during prayer). From this it follows that F D (pray without wearing Tefilin). 2 In Talmudic logic we have that ::F T ðAÞ is not equivalent to F T (A). The first is only a weak prohibition, a recommendation for good behaviour in the eyes of God, while the second is a full fledged strong prohibition. This is reflected in our use of intuitionistic logic as a basis.
The perceptive reader might say that perhaps we could obtain a similar result without the use of intuitionistic logic, by considering explicit permissions which are distinct from the negation of a prohibition.
More specifically, we introduce an additional modal operator P, with the axiom F ! :P, but without the axiom :P ! F. In that case, the negation of permission may correspond to a weak prohibition, but without requiring intuitionistic logic for this purpose.
However introducing another independent operator is too strong and does not manifest the intention that ::F T ðAÞ is only a recommendation of F T (A). Furthermore the idea of explicit permissions is not compatible with Talmudic thinking. God never said in the Bible ''you are allowed to do this''. He only delivered to us Obligations and Prohibitions. See Sect. 5.1 for further discussion. 3 A main difference between biblical obligation and prohibition and ordinary traditional deontic obligation and prohibition is that violation of a biblical prohibition would imply a sanction whereas fulfilment of the corresponding biblical obligation implies a reward. This in an important dimension, and will be further discussed in Sect. 5.1.
However we do not have a direct Biblical prohibition F T (pray without Tefilin), and therefore if one actually does pray without wearing Tefilin, there is no punishment from God.
Note that we do not necessarily have any connections like
If we had them we could have derived
However we know that there is no such axiomatic connection in Talmudic logic.
The reason for that is as we mentioned earlier, O T and F T are in general generic and possibly conflicting, and it is the Rabbis who decide day-to-day how to apply the commands in any given situation. It is possible also to have both F T X and O T X for the same X (even though on the surface this seems contradictory) because X may be a generic kind of predicate and it is expected that the Rabbis will decide for each situation s which obligation/ prohibition applies. In fact, in many cases the Bible gives recipes (more precisely there are indirect hints in the Biblical text but the main derivation of recipes is done in the Talmud) for making such decisions. In our model these recipes are part of the (nonmonotonic) mechanisms of conflict resolution.
It is the job of the Rabbis to make decisions (according to some principles) how to resolve conflicts between obligations and prohibitions when applied to any particular situations. The emphasis of Talmudic deontic logic is therefore on master ones, though opinions differ as to which are included among these 613.) 2. Deciding which Biblical O T X, F T Y apply to any new arising situation s. 3. Resolving possible conflicts between applicable rules for any s.
The role of CTDs is not central to the Talmudic system, nor is the theoretical maintenance of consistency. The Biblical rules are known to cause conflict and established procedures and recommendations and institutions for conflict resolution and practical day-to-day decision making are also given by the Bible.
Note that there are differences between this decision making process and precedents and legislation in law. We shall not go into that here. See however, Sect. 5.3.
The following Table 1 , compares Talmudic deontic ideas with their modern counterparts.
To compare CTDs, let us look at some examples from the Bible.
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Example 1 (Chisholm variant 1)
1. You ought to have a ceremonial meal during the Passover festival. 2. If you have your meal you ought to say prayer (blessing, grace). The translation is as follows (E is Eat and H is sheep):
Note that in (3) we used F D because the Bible is not explicitly prohibiting killing animals for no reason but the prohibition follows from Rabbinical practical rulings.
Thus the reward from God for obeyance is different in the two cases. Note that it is easier to avoid the Chisholm paradox for Examples 1.1 and 1.2 since our logic language is more refined.
The rest of this section will give examples of the major existing types of Talmudic obligations and prohibitions and formalise the examples in terms of O T , F T and F D . The reader should note that we may have less or different paradoxes for the Talmudic system, which has more operators and so more fine distinctions can be made. Furthermore if in ordinary deontic logic we allow more operators to stand for strong moral (parallel to Talmudic) obligations and prohibitions, then we might find that some paradoxes disappear. Although we have not given yet to the reader the axiom system and semantics for these operators, we have given enough of their intuitive meaning and this should suffice for our initial formalisation.
Let us now briefly describe the eight types of obligations and prohibitions available in the Talmud.
We shall also give a preliminary intuitive formalisation in terms of O T , F T and F D (note that O D is definable from F D , so we do not need it). In the sequel, we distinguish Types 1A, 1B and 1C. They all arise from the same Biblical Talmudic obligation O T . The differences between them is practical implementations, as summarised in Table 2 Perhaps a modern example will help. We all read some Harry Potter books. The newspapers reported that the author J. K. Rowling gave her father copies of the first edition of her books, signed and dedicated by her. The idea was that he was supposed to keep them. The father needed money and so he sold them. We formalise the intention/convention by O T keep^F D :keep.
He is not supposed to sell them because he is expected to keep them.
Type 1B weak obligation
There is an obligation to live in the land of Israel. The question is whether from this obligation there is a deontic prohibition on living outside Israel. The answer is no, according to a minority opinion. Now if you do not live in Israel, there is no violation. See Table 2 , item 1B. This is a unique case where the weak obligation is some sort of recommendation. You get a reward if you do it but there is no violation if you do not do it.
Type 1C prohibition arising from positive obligation
We need to let the land rest every seven years. As part of this the fruits of trees on the seventh year are allowed to be eaten by anyone, not just the owners of the tree, ; then I will command My blessing upon you in the sixth year, and it shall bring forth produce for the three years. And ye shall sow the eighth year, and eat of the produce, the old store; until the ninth year, until her produce come in, ye shall eat the old store.
To sharpen and clarify the distinctions between Type 1A and Type 1C, note that during Sukkot, the feast of Tabernacles, we must eat our meals inside the Sukkah, a temporary hut you build in your garden. However if you do eat outside the Sukkah, no punishment is due. It is not clear how to formalise it. Opinions differ, it is either of Type 1A or of Type 1C. The book Minhat Hinuch says that if we adopt Type 1A, then if one uses a stolen Sukkah one has not fulfilled his obligation, since he committed a violation in the process, however, if we adopt the view that the Type is 1C, then he has fulfilled his obligation.
Compare with Type 2. For a prohibition of Type 2, of the form F T X, if we violate it and do perform X we get punished! We do not get punished if we violate Type 1A or Type 1C.
Type 2 full prohibition
The Bible forbids the eating of pork. Leviticus 11:7-8 And the pig, because it is parts the hoof and is cloven-footed but does not chew the cud, is unclean to you. You shall not eat any of their flesh, and you shall not touch their carcasses; they are unclean to you.
Type 3 strong obligation/prohibition
This has the structure
An example of this is the Biblical obligation/prohibition about work on the Sabbath (seventh day). We have, for X = doing work, an obligation not to do work and also a prohibition on working. So this is a very strong demand from God! Another example, if you have a house with accessible roof you must install a railing to the roof to prevent people falling off the roof. This can be interpreted as a typical safety rule. Its status is that of a weak obligation introduced for good practice. If you obey it, you will earn the good will of God. There is also prohibition on being without a railing. So if you do not obey it, there is no punishment. We formalise this by writing
To quote the Bible:
Deuteronomy 22:8 When you build a new house, you must build a railing around the edge of its flat roof. That way you will not be considered guilty of murder if someone falls from the roof. Note that in the Sabbath example the Obligation is on lack of action and the prohibition is on action and in the roof example the obligation is on action and the prohibition is on lack of action.
Contrary to duties

Type CTD I obligation with positive contrary to duty
You should not steal and if you steal you should return what is stolen. We can write:
or maybe the dyadic formalisation:
Type CTD II temporal chain of CTDs
This example is from the Bible.
1. You should not rape a woman. 2. If you do rape a woman you must marry her 5 . 3. If you marry the woman you raped you can never divorce her.
We write this as
Deuteronomy 22:28-29 If a man happens to meet a virgin who is not pledged to be married and rapes her and they are discovered, he shall pay the girl's father fifty shekels of silver. He must marry the girl, for he has violated her. He can never divorce her as long as he lives.
Type CTD III fine tuning required
Let us give some more examples of Contrary to Duties from the Talmud. These examples require further fine tuning and their delicate formalisation is postponed.
1. This is the mainstream example we mentioned before, which we recall here for comparison, that we should not steal but if we do steal we have an obligation to return the stolen property to its rightful owner. (This is a 'repairing' CTD.) 2. We have an obligation to pray three times a day. A morning prayer, an afternoon prayer and an evening prayer. The time for the afternoon prayer is from noon to sunset. The evening prayer should be done after sunset but before sunrise. The rules governing this are as follows:
(a) It is obligatory to pray the afternoon prayer between noon and sunset. (b) If one was not able, due to circumstances beyond his control, to offer the afternoon prayer before sunset one can still fulfill the obligation by offering the afternoon prayer 13 minutes after sunset. (This is called 'make up'.) (c) If time has passed and no afternoon prayer was offered then one can offer the evening prayer twice, to make up for the afternoon prayer.
obligations before the event ('Lechatchila') and what is required after the event ('Bede'eved'). 5. There are many more cases, for example where the same action violates several prohibitions and obligations, some of them contradictory. These are solved in practice (see Sect. 3).
Remark 2.1
The prayer examples and the Yevama example, are very interesting. They hint to a type of contrary to duties which fulfill the original obligation and are not necessarily just secondary obligations, which kick into action when the original obligation is violated. The CTD can actually cancel the original violation. It is not a disjunction. We do not have the disjunctive option of either reading the Book of Esther standing or sitting. We should a priori try to read it standing but if we read it sitting the original obligation to read it sitting is discharged. In comparison, if I steal a book and then return it, I am still in violation of the 'do not steal' obligation. The difference is whether the obligation relates to the process or to the resulting state (after the process).
Let us further remark about the logic involved is the nature of the CTDs in the Talmud. There should be more emphasis on resolving conflicting obligations and prohibitions. The system is built for people to use and live by day-by-day. So the most important feature of the logic is to resolve conflicting obligations and prohibitions arising from a multitude of CTD all triggered by past actions. For this again we need a labelled system. Let us give a modern example to show what we mean and thus realise that ordinary deontic logic has not fully addressed such problems.
Example 2.2 Suppose our starting point is that we have the following:
1. There should be no fence. 2. There should be no dog. 3. If there is a dog there should be a fence. 4. If there is a fence it should be white. 5. If there is a dog and a fence it should be high. 6. If there is a fence and it is not white it should be low.
Some stubborn rebellious landlord does the following sequence of actions (s1) get a dog (s2) build a fence (s3) paint the fence green.
He now decides to be a good boy and asks for our recommendation of what to do about his violation. Should he at least get a builder and modify the fence and make the fence high or low? How do we proceed?
First let us label his actions by the violations he performed, and ask at each stage what our recommendation would have been. Then we ask if there is a simple case of reverse actions (e.g. get rid of the dog) which will restore consistency. Then we decide what to recommend.
So this is a special case of controlled revision see Gabbay et al. (2003 Gabbay et al. ( , 2010 . 6 In anticipation of formulating a formal system for Talmudic logic, let us say that we probably need to extend SDL by allowing labelled formula and include a revision operator *A (A revised) in the object language.
The reader should be aware that the Talmudic way of resolving conflict is different and new to the traditional methods. So there is novelty in that.
Note that Talmudic CTDs have special features as discussed in Remark 2.1. We can write OX and the contrary to duty saying that if in practice you have done X 0 then we consider OX as having been obeyed. So we can write OX and :X ! OX 0 and if X 0 then there is no violation of OX.
Example 2.3 To give you a glimpse of Talmudic style conflict resolution consider the following two obligations 1. you should always be seen wearing a black suit at official receptions 2. you must always wear a dark blue dinner suit at evening formal dinners.
You get a conflict when invited to an evening do with Her Majesty The Queen. What to wear black or dark blue? Modern non monotonic logic will say rule 2 is more specific, so it has priority. Talmudic reasoning also accepts that the more specific norm may have priority, but in this case we have another simple option: Talmudic style conflict resolution will say that in the evening in electric light dark blue looks black. So there is no conflict! Note that this is not a logical solution but a practical one.
Note that we can give a practical solution to Example 2.2 by recommending a low fence. Since the fence is painted green, it blends with the grass and plants and can be considered as not violating the obligation that there should be no fence, but only in this case! If he makes the fence low we will get also (?f) and (-e), and if he makes the fence high we will also have (-f) and (?e).
On the basis of the above history of labels we make a decision.
Controlled revision applies when we start with a theory D 0 and have a series of inputs A 1 ; A 2 ; A 3 . . .. At stage n we have D n , and when we revise to accommodate A n?1 we must remember the entire history of revisions and revise accordingly.
So, for example, if D 0 ¼ fA; A ! Bg and we get :B, we revise and get D 1 ¼ f:B; A ! Bg. If we now get input B, we ordinarily may revise and get D 2 ¼ fB; A ! Bg. But in controlled revision we remember the history, so we know that we took out A and hence we bring it back and revise to D 1. Consider a modal, possibly intuitionistic, logic with three separate KD modalities generated by O T , F T and O D and study the correct axioms governing them. 2. We can equivalently regard O T X and F T X not as modalities but as labels. So each wff X will have several possible labels.
X So the logic would be standard deontic logic applied to labelled formulas. This approach also goes well with the fact that O T and F T obligation and prohibition carry reward or punishment for obeyance and violations respectively. So the labels can be used to indicate that information as well.
Modal systems with labels exist in the literature primarily as Gentzen or tableaux systems and there is work by Gabbay and others in this direction (Gabbay 1996; Basin et al. 2000) . So it should not be difficult to tailor a suitable Talmudic labelled variant of SDL. Our guess is that the system should also be intuitionistic, as we have already mentioned earlier.
We now address the problem of formulating an axiom system and semantics for Talmudic deontic logic.
Our first task is to understand the data better. We say that various prohibitions and obligations come in the Talmud from a divine Biblical source (annotated by O T and F T ). We also know that we may have conflicting obligations and prohibitions emanating possibly directly from the divine source or because of a history of violations and the triggering of contrary to duties. We need to understand how to move from the T operators to the D operators. Once we understand how the Talmud does this, we can construct a logic.
So, before we offer a logic, we need to record and understand this body of data, and the way the Talmud handles conflict resolution.
To focus our thoughts, let us consider an artificial, but familiar example. (Compare with Example 2.2 and footnote 6.) Example 3.1
1. There should not be a fence. 2. There should not be a dog 3. If there is a dog there should be a fence 4. There is a dog Let us pretend that the above are Talmudic obligations and prohibitions, given to us as follows:
Notice that in whatever Talmudic logic we are going to formulate, we may not get the traditional paradox because although we can derive O T (fence)^F T (fence), we have two different independent operators involved.
The Talmud is practical and so it needs to tell us what to do in this case. Imagine a man comes to the Rabbi with a dog and says ''Advise me; fence or no fence?''.
The data is
-an obligation arising after a violation of an F T prohibition.
A decision needs to be made. We use O D to indicate practical obligations, the ones which are the results of the Talmudic rules for conflict resolution which enable us to move from the T operators to the D operators and thus equip us with the tools of making day to day practical decisions. This answer is independent of A, as there is a general rule that O T (A) is stronger than F T (A) for any A.
Let us say the Rabbi tells our man to do a fence, (i.e. O D (fence)), then we have the following decision table, Table 3 .
Here we ignored the fact that O T A is a result of a CTD violation. Let us make this example more complicated. Let us add another obligation to maintain a well kept garden and the contrary to duty that if we do not do so, then we have to have a fence.
So we add to our example 5. O T (well kept garden) 6. : well kept garden ? O T (fence) 7. : well kept garden. Now the conflict is between two cases of O T (fence) (later in the formal system we shall add an index to the T operators to enable us to represent several different uses of them) and one case of F T (fence). we get conflict between several obligations and prohibitions in contexts Z common to several Y i and V j . It is in such cases that the Talmud offers conflict resolution. The interesting aspect of the Talmudic conflict resolution is that it does not depend on the context Z or on how many previous violations were committed in the way to the context Z but it depends purely on the form O T (A), or O T ð:AÞ or F T (A) or F T ð:AÞ of the conflicting participants where A denotes the action discussed.
A close inspection of the Talmud reveals that the underlying logic should be intuitionistic based possibly on decided atomic facts. So doing this for our dog example, we have, (we are simplifying and not counting multiple instances of O T and F T , for example O (i,T) , as above.). Considering the general case, there are twelve options and these options are listed in Table 4 . This table is intuitionistic. Note that A itself, being a fact, is classical, i.e. ::A A holds. Note that A is the action of having a fence.
We now form two 12 9 12 tables indicating how to resolve conflicts between the elements of Table 4. Table 5 indicates the conflict resolution in terms of the T operators, and Table 6 indicates, on the basis of Table 5 , what should be done in practice. We use the intuitionistic operator O D A in Table 6. Thus Tables 5 and 6 together give the Talmudic conflict resolution strategy. For example entry (1, 3) of Table 5 is F T (A) pitted against F T ð:AÞ, and by P6 (b) below, F T (A) wins, and so in Table 5 we put ''1'' in box (1, 3), namely we put ''F T (A)'' in box (1, 3) . Then in Table 6 we put in O D ð:AÞ, to indicate what we do in practice.
We now describe the Talmudic principles behind the construction of Tables 5  and 6. (P0): The entries in Table 6 God if we adopt them. In many practical cases the Rabbis and the courts force people (legislate) to adopt them.
8 Table 4 List of 12 possibilities for Talmudic obligations and or prohibitions for A
F T (A)
A is prohibited To give an example, suppose I find a lost item in the street, say a handkerchief. There are two possibilities to consider. 1. The owner does not bother to come back looking for it. 2. The owner will not give up and come back for it (monogrammed handkerchief).
Legally in case 1 my obligation to seek the owner does not exist since the owner has given up. In comparison in the second case I must pick up the handkerchief and find the owner or give it to the police. However, even in the first case, it is recommended and even legislated that I try and find the owner (e.g. give it to the police), even though the owner has abandoned the handkerchief, i. e. there is no O T (a) O T is stronger than F T , i.e. we always prefer positive norm, so O T wins and therefore Table 5 gives O T and Table 6 gives O D see for example, entry (1, 7). The result is therefore O D . (b) In any conflict between O T A and O T :A or in any conflict between F T A and F T :A, we always prefer to do nothing, hence O T ð:AÞ and F T (A) respectively win, and therefore the entry in Table 6 is O D :A.
Note that we need to use a mechanism to determine for each case A and :A which one is the action and which none is the negation of action. So for example if we have O T (sleep) and O T (be awake) our mechanism needs to determine which one we consider action and hence call it A and which one the lack of action and call it :A. We assume that it is always clear to us which option between A and :A is the action (P7): When there is conflict inside group (P2), there is no clear cut rule. It is reasonable that, since O T is stronger than F T , we also should have that ::O T is stronger than ::F T . 
Intuitionistic standard deontic logic
In Sect. 3 we analysed the conflict resolution method in the Talmud for the operators O T and F T and how they relate to O D .
Our conclusion from Example 3.1 is that we need 248 different O T (X/Y) operators and 365 different F T (U/V) operators. This should not alarm the deontic logician because in the dyadic approach, we have an infinite number of operators O A (X), one for each wff A. The difference between dyadic deontic logic and the Talmudic ones is that the Talmudic operators are generic, and apply to an ever growing open texture context situations Y and V. Let us simplify and begin by giving an Intuitionistic standard deontic logic with one unary (not dyadic) O T and one unary F T , just to be able to compare ordinary classical SDL with the intuitionistic version of it. Remember also that once we fix the context Z of conflict, the dyadic operators become monadic (relative to Z), so our monadic logical machinery is applicable anyway.
We are now ready to address axiom systems and semantics. Our strategy is to first give the operators O T , F T and O D (we don't seem to need F D !) suitable semantics and see whether Table 6 can be derived from some semantic principles. In formal logic this means that the system for O D would be a nonmonotonic intuitionistic modal logic derived in some way from a monotonic intuitionistic modal logic for {O T , F T }. Note that this is a sound policy, as in the area of nonmonotonic logic, the classification of nonmonotonic logics is done in terms of variations on an underlying monotonic base logic.
The reader should beware that our system for O D must be derived nonmonotonically from the system for {O T , F T }. If we look at Table 6 For each atomic q; hðqÞ S is an assignment to the atoms. We have t s ) t 2 hðqÞ ! s 2 hðqÞ:
Satisfaction is defined as follows: 
6. 
We claim this set is consistent. Otherwise for some We define N ðtÞ according to Note that the definition of the logic for {O T , F T , O D } is semantic. We take a model of {O T , F T } and add to it N and make it a model of O D .
Before we continue we need to make an important remark. Suppose a person embarks on a sequence of actions, just doing whatever he wants for a while. He may find himself in a state where a sequence of obligations and prohibitions has been triggered and some of these may be conflicting. In fact an obligation to do some A may have been triggered several times in different contexts for different reasons and similarly the obligation to do :A, as well as the prohibition to do A and the prohibition to do :A.
The We propose to use Table 6 for this purpose. We need to check the coherence of Table 6 , namely that we get a clear answer for each subset ±A whether it should be a member of N ðtÞ. This belief follows from conditions (P1)-(P8), especially (P4)-(P8) which clearly set out conflict resolution rules once we understand the semantic properties of O D we can try to axiomatise it.
If it turns out that we do not have a unique answer in each case we need an expanded new table resolving conflicts between 4 operators at a time and not just two at a time. In fact Remark 4.5 below shows that the table does give unique answers. Before we systematically do all the cases, let us explain the method by giving two examples.
Take for example the triple set f1 : O 1;T ðAÞ; 2 : O 2;T ð:AÞ; 3 : F 1;T ðAÞg, and let us combine them in different orders and see whether we get the same outcome.
Case 1: 2 and 3 give 2 as a winner, see (P6), and now that we have 2, we carry on; 2 and 1 give 2 again by (P6) and the resolution is 4 : O D ð:AÞ Case 2: 1 and 2 give 2 and 2 and 3 give 2 and the resolution is again 4 Case 3: 1 and 3 give 1 and 1 and 2 give 2 and the resolution is again 4. This is because according to Table 6 , 2 is the strongest.
So the answer is 4 no matter at what order we combine them. Indeed this always true that we get a single answer for any group of 3 or 4 items. The Talmud however, does not always agree with the table. As we shall see in Remark 4.5 below, the table is only a very good approximation. Let us look at another example: Consider the triple fO 1;T ðAÞ; F 1;T ð:AÞ; O 2;T ð:AÞg, Table 6 will give the clear cut result O D ð:AÞ. However the Talmud in this case decrees that the combined power of O 1;T ðAÞ; F 1;T ð:AÞ together (which yields according to the usual priorities O T (A)), is stronger than O 2;T ð:AÞ, and so the result should be O D (A). This clearly shows that Table 6 is only an approximation of the way the Talmud combines obligations.
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Remark 4.5 (Coherence of Tables 5 and 6 ) The more complex situations for Table 5 are the cases of three conflicting prohibitions and obligations. We divide the cases into four classes:
One O T and two F T s. We have two subcases. First we take two F T s and compare with O T or first we take {O T , F T } and compare with the second F T . Case 1.1: F 1,T (A), F 2,T (A) and {O T (A)}.
In this case O T is stronger according to entry (1, 7) of Table 5 . Although our Table 5 gives a clear cut answer for this triplet case, the Talmud contains a discussion about whether the answer is acceptable. Some Talmudic scholars express the opinion that two F T (A) can aggregate and be stronger than one O T (A). Other scholars accept the answer of Table 5 as the correct one. So to sum up: The 
(A).
In this case it is clear that O T ð:AÞ wins according to all combinations using Table 6 and (P6). Class 4: Three F T s. This case is completely parallel to Class 3 with similar results. Case 4.1: F 1,T (A), F 2,T (A) and F 3;T ð:AÞ.
In this case (P6) gives that F 3;T ð:AÞ is the winner. Here again some scholars might want to aggregate the two F T (A), with similar discussion to Case 3.1. Case 4.2: F 1;T ð:AÞ; F 2;T ð:AÞ, and F 3,T (A).
In this case it is clear that F T ð:AÞ is the winner.
This concludes our examination of triplets and we verified that Table 5 gives a clear unique answer in each case independent of the order of combination. We noted during our examination that some scholars might want to aggregate, in which case a new table needs to be agreed upon.
Our Table 5 is mathematically coherent for triplets. We now ask: How about sets of four? (P6) and Table 6 is coherent for the Talmud itself does not discuss such cases, and only some later Talmudic scholars raise some examples. We have evidence of discussions of the case of three O T s and one F T .
Case 5: O 1;T ðAÞ; O 2;T ðAÞ; O 3;T ð:AÞ, and F T (A). Table 6 and (P6) give us the unique answer O D ð:AÞ. However, if we start with a choice of triplet and allow for aggregation (which is not according to Table 6 , we get two possible answers. Summary In the case of 4, we see that those who want to aggregate for the case of 3 are still not coherent for the case of 4. So the only way to remain coherent for all cases is to follow (P6) and Table 5 .
Remark 4.6 We make an interesting remark about the case of two O T s and one F T . This is Case 2.2, where the Talmud aggregates and disagrees with Table 5 and (P6). However, there is some Talmudic discussion that does not seem to recognise Table 5 .
The discussion is about how many violations occur in each case. Consider the case O 1;T ð:AÞ; F 1;T ðAÞ; and O 2;T ðAÞ: This is Case 2.1. According to Table 6 , and a God fearing man should follow O D ð:AÞ. Suppose a man decides to do A; we ask how many violations did the man commit? (God punishes for violations!) We might say he violated both O 1;T ð:AÞ and F 1,T (A). This man, however, might argue that he committed only one violation, because if we start with the pair {O 2,T (A), F 1,T (A)} the winner is O 2,T (A) and so F 1,T (A) being the loser according to the Talmud (as reported in (P6) and 
There is a disagreement among scholars with regard to the number of violations in this case, which can be explained by the order in which the triplet is applied.
In contrast to the above, in the case of fO 1;T ðAÞ; F 1;T ð:AÞ; O 2;T ð:AÞg (this is Case 2.2), we saw here that according to Table 5 and (P6), O T ð:AÞ wins, but we saw that the Talmud rules that O T (A) should win, by constructing the aggregated norm FO(A).
Now assume a man does :A. Here we cannot explain the opinion(of some Talmudic scholars) that F 1;T ð:AÞ was not violated using an argument concerning the order of combining the norms, because F 1;T ð:AÞ is aggregated! We can say that :A is a lack of action and claim that one cannot violate in principle any F T ð:AÞ, but one can violate F T (A). However, this does not look convincing. We will to go into this any further.
Anyway, this remark gives the reader a taste of what is involved in Talmudic argumentation about violations.
Remark 4.7 Let us give quick comparisons with the traditional view of obligations and contrary to duties, as described in for example Sergot (1996, 1997 ). Table 5 or similar tables and does not look at the content nor consider how the norm was activated by how many violations of how many other norms. Compare this divine approach with Prakken and Sergot (1996) which tries to determines logically when an obligation OA can pass on to a contrary to duty context OB. The considerations involve A and B.
Concluding remarks
This section will clarify some key points, as promised in the footnotes.
Reward and punishment
In ordinary deontic logic and general legal and ethical systems, it is accepted that the difference between obligations and prohibitions manifests itself in the question of whether we are required to take active action or a deliberate lack of action.
In comparison in Talmudic thinking the difference between obligations and prohibitions is something different. A biblical obligation is a requirement from a man to better himself and a prohibition is a requirement from a man to make sure he does not decline and deteriorate. The question of whether these requirements are fulfilled and obeyed by a man through his taking action or maintaining lack of action is not important. The biblical obligation to observe the Sabbath as a holy day is achieved through lack of action (lack of doing any work). This means that the state of a man of not doing work on the Sabbath is a positive state, it makes him a better man, and we are required to achieve this state. In comparison, the biblical prohibition in Leviticus Chapter 19, verse 16 says Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people; neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbour: I am the LORD.
The Prohibition
Neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbour is the Good Samaritan Rule, requires us not to stand idle when our neighbour needs our help. It being a prohibition does mean that the Bible views the lack of helping as a negative state (and does not view the act of helping as a positive state, not according to this verse). This means that the Bible views helping and saving your neighbour in need is an elementary requirement, a natural state for man, and so obeying this rule does not lead to spiritual betterment but the lack of obeyance of this prohibition can lead to spiritual deterioration.
In comparison, in the case of the Sabbath, the Bible view that natural elementary state for man is to go to work on the Sabbath day, and the obligation to refrain from working on the Sabbath day is a requirement intended for the spiritual betterment from the natural state.
Traditional legal and ethical systems do not offer an objective definition of man's natural state. So in such systems they have only the distinctions between taking actions and maintaining lack of action. In Talmudic biblical law on the other hand the requirement for the betterment of man's state is given in the Bible as an obligation and the requirement not to deteriorate to a worse state is given as a prohibition.
An example from general legal debate is the problem addressed by Nozick (1969 Nozick ( , 1974 regarding Seduction and Blackmail. What is the difference between the two? On the face of it, in both cases one tries to make his neighbour do something. In the case of seduction, we offer our neighbour a reward for taking the action and in the case of blackmail, we offer him punishment in case of his not taking the action. Here again we see that there is a natural state. Any requirement which is not compatible with it is blackmail and any legitimate requirement which is compatible with it is seduction. If I say to a man that if he does a job for me I shall pay him, this is seduction, because in the natural state I need not pay him. But if I say to the man that if he does not do the job for me I shall beat him up, this is blackmail. The reason for that is that not to be beaten up is an elementary right and natural state and he deserved this right even if he does not do the job for me.
How do we define the dividing line between elementary rights and such that are not? We cannot deal with this here.
The Bible indicates this distinction by the way it presents the obligations and prohibitions. If the requirement is written in the Bible as an obligation(to do an action or to maintain lack of action) then the requirement is compatible with what the Bible regards as a natural state and intends to better it, and if the required is a prohibition, then doing (or lack of doing) what is prohibited is not compatible with the natural state and causes deterioration.
We can now understand why the Bible offers a reward for fulfilling obligations and gives no reward for obeying prohibitions, while also it does not punish for not fulfilling obligations and does punish for disobeying prohibitions. The explanation is that reward is forthcoming to those who better themselves, and if they do not better themselves why punish them? On the other hand if a man deteriorates he should be punished and if he avoids deterioration why should he be rewarded?
We discuss this issue at length in the second part of our book, .
Why 613 Talmudic operators?
We now explain why we need so many Talmudic modal operators, 248 for obligations and 365 for prohibitions. Why not have just one operator for obligations and one for prohibitions, as in standard deontic logic?
The basic claim is that as we go through our daily life we may end up in a situation where several different biblical Obligations and prohibitions apply (coming from different sources in the Bible). For example every seventh year we must let our fields rest and we are not allowed to plough our fields. A man may plough his field on the Sabbath on the seventh year, thus he is violating two explicit prohibitions. We can have similar situations with obligations. We may end up in a situation where we have conflicting obligations.So we may have, for example For the practical level, what one is actually supposed to do in any given situation? We make a decision and represent this by one operator O D . If the decision in the case of (1)- (4) The decision what to do is done by Tables 5 and 6 and Remark 4.5.
Comparison with legislation in law
We have already remarked that the general characteristics of Talmudic legal system is different from the general ones. This follows mainly from the fact that in general legal systems we do not have obligations in the sense of Sect. 5.1. We may have laws about what to do and what not to do but not in the normative sense of Sect. 5.1. An ordinary legal system does not give reward for acting according to the obligations of the law; it only imposes punishment on violations of the law. Therefore there cannot be any serious distinction in general law between violation of an obligation to do something and a violation of a prohibition to do something.
In contrast, in the Talmud, such distinctions are central. An obligation is a command to better yourself and a prohibition is a command to stop yourself from deterioration, as discussed in Sect. 5.1. It is therefore natural that there would be different status to obligations and to prohibitions. God rewards you for obeying his obligations and either God or a local court will punish you for violating a prohibition. This is also why the Talmud requires special rules in cases of conflicts between obligations and prohibitions. We do not get too many such rules in general legal systems. The distinctions between the normative level (O T , F T ) and the practical level (O D ) is of course applicable also in general ethical and legal systems, and may even help resolve some legal paradoxes.
For more details, see our book .
Comparison with preference based models
This section will compare our results with three central papers on preference based models for obligations, namely Carmo and Jones (2002) , Cholvy and Garion (2001) , and van der Torre and Tan (1999). To do this successfully and avoid a lengthy presentation of the theoris of these papers, we chose an example addressed by all and use it to show the differences between our paper and their papers.
Consider the dog example: We begin by listing the models we can form out of the propositions ''dog'' and ''sign''. These are: A preferential model for obligation will give a preference relation on the worlds and will derive the obligations from the preference.
Let w ) w 0 mean w is better than w 0 . For example, something reasonable compatible with (a)-(c) is: w ) w 1 ) w 2 and w 4 ) w 3 :
We can argue about what what the status of w 3 is in relation to w 2 or w 1 .
The Talmudic view, as we saw, is looking at what world state we are, say w 2 , and checking what obligations and prohibitions are activated in this state. In this case it would be no dog and yes sign. The Talmud gives rules to decide what to do in practice. The obligations and prohibitions activated at w 2 may be conflicting. (We might remove the dog and put up a sign!)
The preferential approach would largely ask the agent to move to a better preferred world if he can. Carmo and Jones, for example, distinguish between ideal obligation O i (our O T ?) and actual obligation O a (our O D ?).
There is another feature put forward by Carmo and Jones and others and this is the question of whether the agent controls the possibility of change? The agent may not be able or willing to remove the dog or put up a sign. The Talmud recognises this possibility but does not take it into consideration in connection with the question of whether there is a violation. The Talmud always counts as violation if the state is not as it should. So if there is a dog and no sign there are violations. The Talmud might say if the sign is too expensive then the obligation is not valid, but if signs are not available at all then there is still violation.
Carmo and Jones and, to some extent, Cholvy and Garion, may say that if the agent is unable to execute an obligation then either there is no obligation any more or maybe at least there is no violation. The Talmud does not make such connections.
The Torre and Tan paper presents a system of obligations based on preference and defines a should be done if b is done is true iff 1. No :a^b state is preferable to a^b state and 2. The preferred b states are a states.
The Talmud does not use preferences to define its obligations but decrees 613 types of prohibitions and obligations.
To sum up: The above discussion shows that the preferential approach is completely different in flavour from the Talmudic approach. The preferential approach wants the agent to move to a better preferred world. So we need to look how the worlds are organised, see where we are and decide where to go.
The Talmudic approach gives obligations and prohibitions which are triggered by the state of the world you are in. These may be conflicting. There are rules to tell you what to do. You are not moving to a better world but making yourself better.
